Institutional determinants of investment in transition economies by Dang, V
Department of  
Economics and Finance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper No. 09-33 
 http://www.brunel.ac.uk/about/acad/sss/depts/economics
 
Ec
on
om
ic
s 
an
d 
Fi
na
nc
e 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
Vinh Dang 
 
Institutional Determinants of Investment 
in Transition Economies 
 
August 2009 
Institutional determinants of investment in transition economies 
 
Vinh Dang∗
Department of Economics and Finance, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University 
Kingston Lane, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Investment has been found to be a significant determinant of growth. This paper 
analyses the effects of institutions and transition progress on investment rates of 
transition economies since the collapse of the Socialist Bloc. Political institution is 
measured by the Freedom House’s Political Rights and Civil Liberties indexes; 
economic institution is proxied by the Index of Economic Freedom compiled by the 
Heritage Foundation; and transition progress is documented by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development’s transition index. Panel data estimation techniques 
are applied and the results show that institutions and transition progress have expected 
and significant effect on investment rates of transition economies. However, it is the 
progress in all aspects of economic freedom that matters; just some individual economic 
freedom measures are significant marginally. Besides, as conditioning variables, 
growth, saving and financial development (liquid liabilities as % of GDP) are also 
found to have significant and positive effect on investment in transition economies. This 
paper highlights the indirect effect of institutions on economic growth via investment. 
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Institutional determinants of investment in transition economies 
I. Introduction 
Investment is the key to maintaining and expanding the capital stock and 
production capacity of an economy. In the neoclassical growth framework higher capital 
accumulation means higher output and higher growth in transition to the steady state of 
an economy. In endogenous growth theory investment affects growth directly through 
accumulation of input and indirectly through improved factor productivity. New 
investment in physical and human capital introduces new technologies into the 
production base of an economy, thus improving its efficiency and productivity and 
altering its long run growth rate. The role of investment has been empirically confirmed 
in many studies such as: Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), De Long 
and Summers (1991), Fischer (1993), Khan and Kumar (1997), Bouton and Sumlinski 
(2000) and others. In fact, investment is one of the few determinants of growth that 
remain significant in a sensitivity analysis by Levine and Renelt (1992). 
 Since the fall of the Soviet Bloc the former socialist countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe and Central and Eastern Asia have embarked on largely different growth 
paths. All of them except East Asian ones saw their output plunge in the early 1990s. 
Following initial production collapse in Eastern and Central Europe and former Soviet 
Union some countries quickly settled down and regained positive growth as early as 
1992 or 1993 (Poland and Czech Republic) while others dragged on with their output 
contraction until 1995-1996 (Russia, Ukraine, and some other former Soviet Union 
countries). One the basis of growth performance, there seems to be some geographical 
pattern. Countries of the former Soviet Union had to endure longest output drop. Those 
in Central Europe and Baltic area had a shorter period of recession. Those in East Asia 
did not suffer from any output loss at all.  
Many researchers have formulated theoretical explanations and empirical tests 
for various factors that may have caused the marked variation in the growth 
performance of transition economies. Among the often cited determinants of the growth 
variation are initial conditions, liberalization and transition policies, and institutional 
factors1. The question about what drives investment has been long studied2. However, 
 
1 See, for example, De Mello et al. (1996 & 2001), Krueger and Ciolko (1998), Fidrmuc (2003), 
Harvrylyshyn and Roden (2003), Falcetti et al. (2006) for details. 
2 Some examples are: Levine and Renelt (1992), Ozler and Rodik (1992), Dawson (1998), Ghura and 
Goodwin (2000), Attanasio et al. (2000) and Campos and Nugent (2003). 
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works in this field study broad cross sections or panels of countries that do not cover 
transition economies. To our best knowledge, the literature on investment in transition 
countries is focused on firms’ investment constraints and behaviour. Budina et al. 
(2000) study the relation between liquidity constraints and firms’ investment in Bulgaria 
and find that liquidity constraints only bind for small firms; large firms still have access 
to easy bank finance. Similarly, Konings et al. (2003) find soft budget constraints for 
firms in Bulgaria and Romania but Polish and Czech’s firms face hardened liquidity 
constraints which are an impediment for investment. Mueller and Peev (2007) study 
investment returns of publicly traded firms in Central and Eastern Europe and find 
evidence of under investment due to asymmetric information and over investment due 
to managerial discretion. In general, these studies use firm level data and relate firms’ 
investment behaviour to financial constraints. None has tried to explain difference in 
investment rates for the whole group of transition countries. The purpose of this paper is 
to fill this gap in literature on transition economies. Since institutions are theoretically 
proposed and empirically found to be a very important determinant of growth and 
development, we are particularly interested in examining the role of institutions and 
reform policies in explaining investment difference among transition economies. 
Analyzing a dataset on transition economies over the period 1990-2007 we find 
that institutional factors, both economic and political, have significant effect on the 
investment rate. In addition, more transition progress is also found to be associated with 
higher investment. Domestic saving and financial deepening are strong determinants of 
investment as well. 
Section II of this paper will discuss institutional development and investment in 
transition economies since the early years of the transition process. Section III will 
explore possible determinants of investment in transition economies. After that Section 
IV will present the data and empirical approach for estimating the effects of institutional 
factors on investment. Section V will discuss the results and the paper is concluded in 
Section VI. 
II. Institutions and investment in transition economies  
1. Institution building in transition economies 
Transition economies are in a process of building new market-based institutions 
to promote economic growth. Most of them started with an “institutional collapse” 
(Campos and Coricelli, 2002) which is often cited as one of the reasons for the initial 
output drop in these economies. However, institutional quality in transition economies 
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has improved quickly and substantially. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom3 (IEF) and the Freedom House Index (FHI)4. 
The IEF is a composite index of ten different factors of economic freedom rated on the 
scale of 0-100, with higher value representing more freedom. The FHI is a measure of 
political freedom which is a simple average of civil liberties (CL) and political rights 
(PR) with score going from 0 to 7 with 7 being no freedom. In Figure 1, for the ease of 
comparison, the Freedom House Index is rescaled to the 0-100 range and higher value 
means more freedom5. The lines in Figure 1 represent the averages of either IEF or FHI 
for three groups of transition economies: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), former 
Soviet Union (FSU) and East Asia (EA). All three groups have made significant moves 
towards freedom, both economic and political, but the CEE countries are the fastest. 
They started with better institutional quality and are now in a much better position than 
the FSU or EA countries. The EA countries started at the lowest level of freedom and 
are still far behind the others. 
Another widely used measure of economic freedom is the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom Index (EFI)6. This index is available from 1970 but before 2000 it 
is only available for every five years. Besides, we have EFI for only 21 transition 
countries. The EFI scores ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 being most free. Figure 2 shows 
the changes of EFI for three groups of transition economies over 2000-2006 and we can 
see the same trend as shown in Figure 1.  
 
3 Holmes et al., 2008 
4 Data available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439  
5 See more details about these indexes in Section IV 
6 See Gwartney et al., 2008 for details 
Figure 1: Fraser Institute's Index of Economic Freedom (1995-2007) 
and Freedom House Index (1990-2007)
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 There is a wide gap in institutional quality between transition economies. Some 
countries have achieved institutional quality that is at the same level or even higher than 
developed countries. In 2008 Latvia, Czech Republic and Hungary had higher IEF score 
than France or Portugal. At the same time Russia, Belarus and Turkmenistan were 
ranked 136, 147 and 152 respectively out of 157 countries in 2008. In terms of political 
freedom, the Freedom in the World Report 2008 categorizes all CEE countries as free 
while most of FSU and EA countries as not free. The experience of transition 
economies in terms of building a completely new institutional system (in Central and 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries) or reforming an old system (in East 
Asia) for the functioning of a market economy can be viewed as something close to a 
natural experiment for analyzing the effect of institutions on investment. 
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Figure 2: Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index, 2000-2006
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2. Investment in transition economies 
Initially, investment fell sharply in the CEE and FSU countries. When the 
government revenue was low and business environment was just taking form this was 
quite a foreseeable situation. In East Asian countries, though the investment did not fall 
but it hardly saw any growth in the early 1990s. Figure 3 shows that the investment was 
cut the most in the FSU countries and these are the last who recovered from investment 
downturn. On average, EA has the highest investment growth (11.13%), followed by 
CEE (6.62%) and FSU (3.65%). 
Figure 4 depicts the investment-GDP rates of transition economies by groups. 
Except for 1990 the EA has always maintained a higher investment rate than those of 
CEE and FSU. Since 1997 this rate has gone up from around 25% to 33% (in 2007). 
The investment rates of CEE and FSU have also increased from 20% in early 1990s to 
25% in 2007.  
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Figure 3: Growth rate of investment, 1992-2007
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Figure 4: Investment/GDP (%), 1990-2007
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Figure 5 is a scatter plot of the investment rate and GDP growth rate in 30 
transition economies over the 1995-2006 period. It shows us some positive association 
between growth rate and investment rate. Though the investment-growth relation is not 
the subject of this paper it helps justify the purpose of this paper. If we know factors 
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that drive investment we may know what drives growth, at least partially. To better 
understand causes of growth we need to understand the factors that determine the 
investment rate. 
Figure 5: Investment-growth in transition economies, 1995-2006
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III. Literature review - determinants of investment rate 
In this paper we explore some essential factors that are theoretically expected 
and empirically proven to affect investment rate in contexts other than transition 
economies. They are categorized as institutions, transitional reform policies, 
macroeconomic factors, and financial development. 
1. Institutional factors 
Institutions in the words of North (1991) “define the choice set and therefore 
determine transaction and production costs and hence the profitability and feasibility of 
engaging in economic activity…Institutions provide the incentive structure of an 
economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards 
growth, stagnation or decline.”7 Accordingly, institutions facilitate economic 
exchanges, determine resource allocation and efficiency of economic activities. 
Institutions are associated with constraints, both natural and man-made, that economic 
actors face. An important institution is the level of freedom, both economic and 
political, that economic actors face in pursuit of their economic goals. When people are 
free from fear of expropriation and troubles inherent in market (information, agency, 
                                                 
7 North, 1991, p.97 
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coordination, etc.) they have more incentive to invest in economic activities and do so 
with higher efficiency. 
With regard to investment the most important institution is the protection of 
property rights. Without secure property rights the incentives to invest will be reduced, 
especially in research and development activities that require large investment but, 
potentially, are very profitable. When properties are not properly protected resources 
will be diverted away from production, often to rent-seeking activities which further 
deter investment while encouraging further rent-seeking. Murphy et al. (1993) argue 
that rent-seeking activities exhibit natural increasing returns, which may lead to 
multiple equilibria with high levels of rent-seeking and low output. Acemoglu (1995) 
shows that rent-seeking reduces marginal productivity of investment and that increased 
rent-seeking makes rent-seeking relatively more attractive compared to investment in 
production. It has been argued by many authors, like North (1990) and Knack and 
Keefer (1995), that the private property rights are the backbone of the prosperous 
Western capitalism.  
 Transaction cost is a big hurdle for economic exchange and evolution of 
institutions through economic history has been the finding of solutions to the problem of 
high transaction cost. New institutions help reduce transaction cost, encourage more 
production and exchanges, thus allowing economic actors to realize gains from 
specialization and trade. As a result productive activities become more attractive and 
more investment is made. With the same level of investment, lower transaction cost 
means more output.  
Corruption is an example of bad institutions and it is very harmful to investment. 
Corruption is a kind of tax, hence raising costs and uncertainty for business activities. 
Worse than tax, corruption is not transparent, not predictable and not reliable. 
Corruption tends to reduce government revenues (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998) because 
corruption is the most manifest in tax collection and the corrupt money, instead of being 
spent by the government on investment or consumption, goes into private pockets. 
Therefore the level of investment will be lower when corruption is rampant, which is 
proved empirically by Mauro (1995). More seriously, corruption makes investment less 
efficient. In public sector corruption may shift public investment away from the most 
profitable projects to less profitable ones that offer more opportunities for corruption 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Pritchett (2000) cites an example of a steel mill in Nigeria 
where spending overshot by US$ 4 billion and US$ 2 billion are reported to be stolen by 
government officials. In the private sector, corruption favours those with connections 
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with government officials over those who have high productive efficiency (Elliott, 
1997). In addition, bad governance reduces the incentive to invest in R&D (Meon and 
Weil, 2005), thus limiting opportunities to improve efficiency.  
Apart from institutions that constrain directly economic activities, political and 
civil institutions are also very important for capital accumulation. Rodrik (2000) 
considers democracy as a meta-institution for building good institutions and argues that 
participatory political systems are the most effective ones for processing and 
aggregating local knowledge which is essential for building institutions. Sandholtz and 
Koetzle (2000) find that corruption is lower when democratic norms and institutions are 
stronger. In an effort to explain causes of corruption Treisman (2000) also concludes 
that democracy reduces corruption though it is well-established democracy rather than 
recent democratization process that matters (Sung (2004) also comes to similar 
conclusion).  As Dawson (1998) empirically shows, political and civil liberties stimulate 
investment in a cross section of 85 countries.  
2. Transitional factors 
Transition process involves liberalization of markets and prices, privatization of 
state-owned firms, restructuring firms towards market incentives and building economic 
and social institutions and infrastructures to promote growth. When markets and prices 
are liberalised, investors have more incentives to invest and do business because they 
have the freedom to set prices and sell and buy goods to where/who they want. 
Privatization of state assets is perhaps the most important drive for investment because 
more assets are in private sector’s hand with their rights recognized by the state. 
Privatization is a signal of commitment to private ownership and offers profitable 
investment opportunities, especially in public utilities sector (Holland and Pain, 1998). 
Besides, governments would have larger budget from privatization proceeds to spend on 
public investment.  
Structural reforms in transition countries have been implemented extensively, 
especially privatization of small scale enterprises (IMF, 2000). However, the reform 
progress has been uneven across countries. In 2005 the Transition Index, which is 
constructed by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) to 
reflect the transition progress, ranges from 1.89 (Turkmenistan) to the highest level of 
4.3 (Hungary, Czech Republic and some others).  
Reform as measured by the EBRD Transition Index is expected to boost 
investment in transition countries because they create room for private sector’s 
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participation in economic activities through privatization and incentives for 
entrepreneurs to invest. Moreover, privatization generates government revenue for 
government investment development programmes.  
3. Macroeconomic and financial factors  
Macroeconomic policies, together with institutions, shape the incentive 
structures that investors face when making investment decision. Domestic saving and 
growth provide the necessary resources for both government and entrepreneurs to 
invest. Trade policy, macroeconomic stability (inflation) and public finance are 
important factors to be considered. Financial system is the blood vessel of an economy 
that channel funds from saving to investment and the level of financial  development is 
expected to have a strong role in determining investment of an economy.  
3.1. Savings 
The relationship between saving and investment has been a focal topic in 
economic literature since the study of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), which identified 
what later came to be called the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Contrary to the prediction of 
the perfect capital mobility theory, Feldstein and Horioka observe that, for OECD 
countries, domestic saving rates and domestic investment rates are highly correlated. 
Nowadays, global financial integration has gone very far but most transition economies 
still face many obstacles in accessing the international capital market and domestic 
savings is still critical for investment and growth. Analyzing a panel of 150 countries 
over 1960-1994 period, Attanasio et al. (2000) find that lagged saving rates are 
positively correlated with investment rates. As a result, we expect that lagged savings 
rate in transition economies should have a positive effect on the investment rate. 
3.2. Growth 
The significant role of investment in growth has been found in many cross 
section studies as mentioned in the Introduction. Some other growth models suggest that 
a rise in productivity growth causes both growth rates and investment rates to move 
together (Barro, 1991 and Islam, 1995). For the effect of growth on investment the 
accelerator theory argues that high growth rates lead to high demand for capital stock 
and real investment and vice versa though the adjustment may take time. The effect 
could also run indirectly through saving rate as Loayza et al. (2000) shows that private 
saving rates rise with the level and growth rate of real income. Empirically, when the 
dynamics of the growth-investment relation is studied it has been shown that “growth 
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rates Granger-cause investment rates with a positive sign” (Attanasio et al., 2000). 
Therefore, we expect lagged growth rate to have positive effect on investment. 
3.3. Trade Policy 
Gains from trade have long been studied and emphasized in the economic 
literature. A more export-oriented economy would have more access to world market, 
which makes it possible for producers to invest and obtain gains from economy of scale. 
More export would bring about more foreign exchange earnings necessary to finance 
import of capital goods, which is very important for economies in the process of 
restructuring their production base. However, trade liberalization may lead to domestic 
market being swamped by imported goods and domestic producers find it hard to 
compete, thus limiting domestic producers’ investment and expansion activities. 
Therefore, there is an argument for protection of some infant industries with high level 
of externalities, learning by doing and economy of scale against foreign competition 
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999). Of course whether the infant industries grow to be 
competitive internationally requires much more than protection by trade measures.   
3.4. Inflation 
According to Fisher (1993) inflation is the most important single indicator of the 
macroeconomic environment as far as investment and growth is concerned. Inflation 
signals uncertainty and makes it difficult for investors to evaluate their investment 
projects, thus forcing them to postpone investment. During high inflation episodes 
economic actors tend to switch from long term to short term transactions, which 
increase transaction cost. In some empirical studies inflation has been found to have 
significantly negative effect on private investment (e.g. Greene and Villanueva, 1991; 
and Ozler and Rodrik, 1992). However, high inflation often means low real interest rate, 
which makes borrowings cheaper for investors. Romer (2001) argues that inflation is 
also a potential source of government revenue through seignorage and under some 
conditions it is optimal for government to use this revenue resource in addition to usual 
taxes. Empirically, Bleaney (1996) finds no negative effect of inflation on total 
investment. Therefore, we can expect some mixed or insignificant effect of inflation on 
investment.  
3.5. Government consumption expenditure 
Analyzing an endogenous growth model with government spending, Barro 
(1990) argues an increase in non-productive government expenditures, for a given level 
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of productive government expenditures, would raise income tax rate. As a result, private 
sector investment would go down because individuals have less incentive to invest. In 
reality, it is possible that an increase in non-productive government spending leads to a 
decrease in investment in both public and private sectors. Especially, if government 
consumption is financed by borrowing it gives rise to public debt and consequently 
investors’ doubt about the stability of the macroeconomic environment and future tax 
burden. Empirically, Barro (1991) shows that higher government consumption is 
associated with lower growth in a panel of 98 countries in the 1960-1985 period. 
Therefore, higher level of government consumption relative to GDP is expected to have 
negative impact on investment. 
3.6. Financial development 
Availability of finance is one of the most important factor for entrepreneurs to 
carry out business activity. Financial system pools savings together and channels funds 
from savers to investors. Without a financial system savers often hoard their savings in 
non-productive assets such as gold and jewellery. According to Levine (1997) 
individual savers may not have the time, capability and means to collect and process 
information on firms and investment opportunities, therefore they are not willing to 
invest. Financial institutions help solve this information problem. Financial institutions 
select, supposedly, the best investors who can make the most from available funds. 
Financial system in developing or transition economies play an even more important 
role because firms in these economies depend more on external financing than those in 
developed economies (Oshikoya, 1994). In addition, financial intermediation creates 
money and provides means of transaction, reducing transaction cost and promoting 
economic exchange and expansion of production (Levine, 1997). Without a well-
functioning financial system it is very difficult for firms to engage in selling their 
products to foreign markets and importing capital goods for investment and expansion. 
In general, we can expect a positive effect of financial deepening on investment. 
IV. Data and model 
1. Data  
For economic freedom the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 
(IEF) and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (EFI) are the most popular 
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measures. However, the Fraser Institute’s EFI covers only 21 transition countries8 and 
before 2000 it was only available for every five years. In this paper we use the Heritage 
Foundation’s IEF as a proxy of economic freedom. The data start in 1995 and are 
available for all transition countries. The IEF is a simple average of 10 individual 
freedoms which are considered vital to the development of personal and national 
prosperity. The individual freedoms are: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal 
freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, 
property rights, freedom from corruption and labour freedom. The methodology for 
constructing the freedoms has been revised several times to enhance the robustness and 
the entire time series have been recalculated accordingly. For the 2008 version of the 
IEF the authors use a 0-100 percent grading scale so that a higher score represents more 
freedom. The difference between this data set and others is that the values of the 
variables are calculated with data available from various sources like the World Bank 
Development Indicators9, which are more objective than subjective survey data. For 
available data, the correlation coefficient between the Heritage Foundation’s IEF and 
the Fraser Institute’s EFI is 0.83 (126 observations). 
For political institutions, two measures are widely used in the literature10: civil 
liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) reported in the Freedom House’s Freedom of the 
World. The Freedom House uses surveys and assessment reports to evaluate the actual 
rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals in almost all countries in the world since 
1972. Political rights refer to free participation in the political process, right to vote 
freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, right to compete for public office, 
join political parties and organizations. Civil liberties mean the freedoms of expression 
and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy 
without interference from the state. The Freedom of the World does not rate government 
or government performance per se but the real world rights and freedoms. The PR and 
CL are scored from one to seven for each country in each year with larger number 
indicating less freedom. The PR and CL are highly correlated (0.94) in this sample.  
The EBRD transition scores are the judgement of the EBRD’s Office of the 
Chief Economist about country-specific progress in transition. The scores range from 1 
to 4+, with 4+ coded as 4.33 and 4- equal 3.67 and so on. Averages are obtained by 
rounding down. For example, a score of 2.6 is treated as 2+, but a score of 2.8 is treated 
 
8 18 Central and Eastern European countries and three East Asian countries. 
9 See Miles et al. (2006) for details. 
10 See Rodrik (2000) and Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2003) for example. 
 14
as 3-. The higher the scores the more transition progress a country has made. The 
following aspects of transition are assessed and scored: large scale privatization, small 
scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade 
and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate 
liberalization, securities market and non-bank financial institutions, and infrastructure 
reform. Due to data availability, we do not use scores of infrastructure reform in this 
paper. The data on transition indicators is available for download from the EBRD’s 
website. Unfortunately, we do not have the transition indicators for four East Asian 
transition countries: Cambodia, China, Laos and Vietnam as the EBRD does not report 
them for these countries.  
Data for dependent variable and control variables other than institutional ones 
are collected from the World Bank Development Indicators (2008). Investment is total 
fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP. Saving is domestic saving as percentage 
of GDP. Growth is the real GDP growth rate. Openness is measured by the sum of 
import and export as percentage of GDP. For inflation we use the change in GDP 
deflator instead of change in Consumer Price Index (CPI) because the CPI inflation 
series has more missing observations. For financial development we use a very popular 
indicator which is the liquid liabilities as percentage of GDP (M3/GDP).  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Investment 508 22.931 6.970737 2.64657 53.19781 
Growth  520 2.2598 8.842172 -44.9 34.5 
Saving 515 17.888 14.54631 -71.8218 60.2495 
OPEN 524 95.038 34.40703 18.9275 181.6826 
M3 444 37.609 27.68181 4.89446 163.31 
Government consumption 515 16.139 5.541831 3.46506 30.12439 
Inflation 519 169.77 816.6941 -5.18003 15442.3 
Economic Freedom 358 54.528 9.445138 30.0193 77.96444 
Transition Index 468 3.3905 1.032538 1 4.33 
Freedom House Index 522 3.8736 1.964979 1 7 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, EBRD; 
author’s calculation 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of variables used in the paper and Table 
2 shows the pair wise correlation between them. As discussed in Section II, there are 
quite large variations in both the dependent and independent variables. The correlation 
between three composite measures of institution is high, ranging from 0.58 to 0.74 in 
absolute value (Table 2). This suggests some consistency in measuring institutional 
quality in transition economies, especially between the economic freedom and transition 
progress index (correlation coefficient of 0.74). 
 
Table 2 
Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 
Growth 
(lagged) 
Saving 
(lagged) OPEN M3/GDP 
Government 
consumption Inflation 
Economic
Freedom 
 Transition 
Index 
Freedom 
House 
Index 
Growth (lagged) 1         
Saving (lagged) 0.0565 1        
OPEN -0.0383 0.0509 1       
M3 0.0985 0.388 -0.0356 1      
Government 
consumption -0.2411 0.153 0.1256 0.0996 1     
Inflation -0.4558 -0.066 0.066 -0.0635 -0.0685 1    
Economic 
Freedom 0.1899 -0.004 0.3012 0.2325 0.1723 -0.2452 1   
Transition Index 0.4567 -0.192 0.1612 0.1706 -0.0163 -0.2613 0.7448 1  
Freedom House 
Index 0.0411 0.0772 -0.2753 -0.1181 -0.3493 0.0916 -0.6628 -0.5858 1 
 
2. Model and methodology 
In order to test empirically for the role of institutions in determining investment 
rate we estimate a panel data model as follows: 
0 1 2 1 3 1 4 5 6 73it it it it it it it it i itINV INS GRO SAV OPEN INF M GCON cα α α α α α α α− −= + + + + + + + + +ε
                                                
(1) with i=1, 2, …N and t=1, 2, …, T 
The dependent variable INV is investment as percentage of GDP and ci is an 
unobserved effect that is country specific and time constant. The εit are the idiosyncratic 
errors that change across time t and country i. INS is institutional variable which can be 
composite indexes like IEF, FHI and EBRD or any individual factors of them. GRO is 
the (lagged) real GDP growth rate11. SAV is the (lagged) gross domestic saving as 
percentage of GDP. OPEN is the level of openness of an economy or the ratio of the 
 
11 Use of real GDP per capita growth rate does not change the result. 
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sum of import and export to GDP. INF is inflation rate based on GDP deflator and M3 
is the ratio of liquid assets to GDP. GCON is the government consumption as 
percentage of GDP.  
This is a panel data model with a country specific unobserved effect that can be 
estimated by either fixed effect (FE) estimation or random effect (RE) estimation 
techniques. The difference between FE and RE is that the RE model assumes no 
correlation between the regressors and ci. If the assumption is correct, together with 
assumptions on the idiosyncratic error, the RE is more efficient than the FE. Otherwise, 
the RE is not consistent but the FE is. When estimating this model we try both FE and 
RE and test for the one that fits the data better and report results accordingly12. Besides 
we also test for the exogeneity of the regressors13. We always report results which are 
robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
As we can see in the Table 2, the IEF, FHI and EBRD are highly correlated. 
Therefore they are entered to the regression equation separately14. For estimation with 
IEF and its factors we use the data for the period 1995-2007 because the IEF is only 
available from 1995. For estimation with FHI, EBRD and their components the data is 
from 1990-2007 but the EBRD data is only available for 26 countries (former socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe and members of the former Soviet Union plus Mongolia). 
Because of missing observations our dataset is an unbalanced panel. A list of countries 
in the dataset and country averages of variables used in our regression can be found in 
the appendix. 
V. Results and discussion 
First, we estimate equation (1) with the composite measures of economic 
freedom (IEF), political freedom (FHI) and transition progress (EBRD). The results are 
shown in Table 3. All indicators of institutions and transition progress are significant 
and have expected signs. The political freedom effect is larger due to the fact that FHI 
ranges from 1 to 7 while the IEF varies between 0 and 100. On average a ten point 
increase in the composite measure of economic freedom, all else equal, is associated 
with 1.6% increase in the investment rate and an additional point in political freedom (a 
 16
                                                 
12 Hausman test is often used to determine the choice of RE or FE but Hausman test is not robust to 
heteroskedasticity of the error term. We use a robust method suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p.290) 
which is done by “xtoverid” command in STATA. 
13 Under strict exogeneity, γ should not be significant in the regression 
it it it ity x wβ γ εΔ = Δ + + Δ where wit is a subset of xit (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 285). 
14 When any pair of them is used in a regression at least one variable becomes insignificant. 
Consequently, they are used separately. 
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lower score of FHI by one point) is associated with 1.36% increase in the investment 
rate. Of the political freedom measures, only the political rights have significant effect 
on investment but the inclusion of civil liberties in the political freedom measure 
reinforces the effect (see column (2) and (4) in Table 3). This may be due to the fact that 
we have more variation in PR than in CL15. If the general indicator of transition 
progress EBRD is one point higher we can expect to have a 1.78% increase in the 
investment rate though the effect is only significant at 10% level. Our result here 
concurs with what is found in Dawson (1998) and Ghura and Goodwin (2000) with 
regard to the effect of institutions on growth. 
Lagged GDP growth rate is highly significant in all estimations except for that 
with IEF (column (1)). When political freedom or transition index are used the effect of 
lagged growth on investment is from 0.13 to 0.17, which means a 1% increase in last 
year’s growth is associated with an increase of from 0.13% to 0.17% in investment rate. 
The lagged saving rate also has significant impact on investment as expected and the 
magnitude of the impact does not change much across estimations. A 1% increase in 
lagged saving rate causes the investment to increase by from 0.11% to 0.13%. 
Table 3 
Estimation results with economic freedom (IEF), political freedom (FHI)  
and transition progress (EBRD) 
Dependent variable: investment/GDP 
  
IEF 
(1) 
FHI 
(2) 
EBRD 
(3) 
PR 
(4) 
CL 
(5) 
Institution 0.16*** 0.136*** 1.779* 0.11*** 0.045 
Lagged growth -0.014 0.162*** 0.132*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 
Lagged saving 0.129** 0.126*** 0.11*** 0.131*** 0.115*** 
OPEN 0.009 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.019 
M3/GDP 0.102*** 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 
Inflation -0.001 0 0.001 0 0 
Govcon 0.105 -0.073 -0.09 -0.096 -0.119 
constant 6.449* 12.24*** 11.85** 13.2*** 21.26*** 
Est. method FE FE RE FE RE 
No. of obs. 325 408 361 408 408 
R2 0.3 0.31 0.27 0.3 0.28 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard 
errors). 
                                                 
15 PR and CL have means of 3.85 and 3.88 and standard deviations of 2.21 and 1.77 respectively. 
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In these estimations, the trade openness and inflation rate have no significant 
effects on investment rate of transition economies16. The indicator of financial 
development M3/GDP is always significant and positive, which means more financial 
deepening is associated with higher investment rate. The government consumption 
expenditure has negative coefficients in all estimations but the effect is not significant.  
The use of composite indexes of economic freedom aggregated from various 
components has been criticised by several authors (Heckelman and Stroup, 2000) on the 
ground of the arbitrariness of weighting schemes and differences in effects of different 
freedom components17. Therefore, one question we want to answer is which individual 
economic freedoms and transition indicators have significant effect on investment and 
which are not.  
 
Table 4 
Estimation results with nine individual economic freedoms 
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP 
 Business Trade Fiscal Government Monetary Investment Finance Property Corruption
Institution 0.07* 0.034 0.036 0.017 0.018* 0.018 0.028 -0.01 0.045* 
Lagged growth 0.035 0.016 0.003 0.022 0.008 0.03 0.027 0.027 0.022 
Lagged saving 0.135** 0.149** 0.154*** 0.146** 0.14** 0.143** 0.144** 0.148*** 0.149** 
OPEN 0.022 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.017 
M3/GDP 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.112*** 0.125*** 0.12*** 0.122*** 0.118*** 
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
Govcon 0.069 0.108 0.086 0.092 0.127 0.102 0.108 0.099 0.088 
constant 9.52** 11.56*** 11.69*** 12.65*** 12.83 12.23*** 12.24*** 13.87*** 12.18 
Est. method FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
No. of obs. 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors). 
 
Table 4 shows results of estimations with nine individual economic freedoms18. 
To our surprise, of the nine economic freedoms, we find that only three have significant 
effect on investment rate: business freedom, monetary freedom and freedom from 
                                                 
16 Lagged inflation rate is also used in place of current inflation rate but the result does not change. Ghura 
and Goodwin (2000) do not find significant effect of inflation either. 
17 Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002) find that only legal structure, private ownership and freedom to use 
alternative currency have positive and robust relation with growth. 
18 We do not use labour freedom because data for labour freedom is only available from 2005. 
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corruption. The result shows that when individual freedoms are considered they do not 
have strong effect on investment because each of them does not make a considerable 
difference to the investment environment. However, when they stand together in the 
form of a composite indicator (IEF) they have a significant joint effect on investment. 
This calls for improvement of the quality of economic institutions in all aspects in order 
to promote investment (an expectedly growth). With regard to other explanatory 
variables the same results emerge in Table 4. Financial depending is consistently 
significant and positive while trade openness, inflation and government consumption 
are not significant.  
 
Table 5 
Estimation results for eight EBRD individual transition indicators 
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP 
 
  
Large scale 
privatization 
Small scale 
privatization 
Governance 
and 
enterprise 
restructuring
Price 
liberalization 
Trade and 
foreign 
exchange 
system 
Competition 
policy 
Bank reform 
and interest 
liberalization 
Securities 
market and 
non-financial 
institutions 
Institution 2.812*** 1.681** 1.773* 0.626 1.223* 2.328** 1.563*** 1.374** 
Lagged growth 0.092** 0.11* 0.141*** 0.167*** 0.136*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.135*** 
Lagged saving 0.101** 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.096** 0.108*** 0.104*** 
OPEN -0.01 0.009 0.015 0.02 0.018 0.008 0.012 0.014 
M3/GDP 0.075** 0.075*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.057** 0.058*** 0.057** 
Inflation 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 
Govcon -0.068 -0.087 -0.114 -0.131 -0.095 -0.062 -0.096 -0.117 
constant 12.21 12.58*** 14.96*** 16.17*** 13.64 13.87 15.23*** 16.57*** 
Est. method FE RE RE RE RE FE RE RE 
No. of obs. 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 
R2 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors). 
 
Table 5 shows estimation results when individual transition indicators are used. 
All of them, except price liberalization, have a significant and positive effect on 
investment rate. The result of price liberalization is unexpected because it is one of the 
most advocated topics in transition reform. Among the transition indicators large scale 
privatization has the highest effect on investment rate. The reason may be that large 
scale privatization is a strong signal of commitment to restructuring of an economy and 
determination to develop a market economy, which stimulates investment from private 
sector. In addition, large scale privatization is an important source of revenue for 
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governments to carry out their development programmes. Progress in reforming 
securities market and non-financial institutions have the smallest effect on investment. 
It may reflect the fact that financial market in transition economies are still in the very 
initial stage of development and they are mostly dependent on the banking system to 
cater for their investment needs (Mueller and Peev, 2007). Once again, financial 
development in form of the ratio of liquid assets to GDP has positive and significant 
effect on investment rate. 
In Table 3 we use indexes of economic freedom and liberalization which are 
aggregated by equal weighting. Because arbitrary weighting schemes may not 
appropriately reflect the magnitude or even the direction of each individual element’s 
marginal impact (Heckelman and Stroup, 2000) we use principal components analysis 
(PCA) to construct composite measures of freedom that best reflect the original data. 
The PCA helps reduce the dimensionality of the data while retains the maximum 
variation of the underlying variables. More importantly, the PCA does not impose any 
subjective judgement but combine variables together according to their relative 
variance. Moreover, by construction the principal components are independent of each 
other. Usually, the number of principal components to retain for estimation is 
determined by the parallel analysis and the Velicer’s minimum average partial 
correlation analysis. Another “rule of thumb” is the Kaiser’s eigenvalue>1 but it is not 
very popular. After applying the PCA for nine IEF variables and eight EBRD variables 
and selecting the number of components according to those methods, we come up with 
two principal components (PC1 and PC2) for both the economic freedom measures and 
the liberalization indexes. The reason is because for the economic freedom data 
Velicer’s method suggests one, while the parallel analysis and Kaiser’s eigenvalue 
suggest nine, which is not meaningful. For the EBRD data the Velicer’s method 
suggests two while the parallel analysis and the Kaiser’s eigenvalue indicate that two 
components should be used.  
Though principal component analysis has a nice property of allowing the data to 
determine both the proper magnitude and sign for aggregating the elements into a single 
index, this method is not without caveat which is the difficulty in interpreting the 
coefficients of the components because they are not chosen on the basis of any 
relationship to the explained variable. In order to make sense of the components we 
need to look at the relation between them and the underlying variables whose 
relationship with the explained variable are better known to us. Table 6 shows the 
eigenvectors of the components we retain. The left panel is for the first two components 
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of the IEF data and the right panel is for those of the EBRD data. Concerning the IEF 
data, the first component is strongly and positively related to investment freedom, 
financial freedom, property rights and freedom from corruption but it is strongly and 
negatively related to freedom of government. If we have higher score for this 
component it can be attributed to either advance in investment freedom, financial 
freedom, property rights and freedom from corruption or less freedom from 
government. If the coefficient of this component is positive and significant we can say 
that more involvement of the government in the economy is associated with higher 
investment rate, which is not surprising given that we use total investment measure. The 
second IEF component is dominated by monetary freedom and freedom from 
government. Concerning the EBRD data, the first component is positively and strongly 
correlated with all measures of liberalisation. It can be seen as representing the overall 
liberalization progress. The second EBRD component is positively related to 
liberalisation scores in securities market, banking and interest rate and level of 
competition but negatively related to liberalisation scores in terms of price and trade and 
foreign exchange. So it can be thought of as a contrast between financial sector 
liberalisation and price liberalisation. We have seen that price liberalisation alone does 
not have significant effect on investment while other liberalisation indexes do in Table 
5. 
Table 6 
Eigenvectors of principal components (PC1 and PC2) 
 IEF  EBRD 
Variable PC1 PC2 Variable PC1 PC2 
BIZF 0.2609 -0.0416 LSPRI 0.3891 0.1627 
TRAF 0.1811 0.0711 SSPRI 0.4284 -0.186 
FISF -0.0176 0.2881 RESTRU 0.2927 0.2772 
GOV -0.4076 0.4608 PLIB 0.3277 -0.4889 
MONF 0.274 0.8098 TRA_FOREX 0.4757 -0.4339 
INVF 0.418 -0.0259 COMPET 0.2262 0.35 
FINF 0.4949 0.1109 BANK_IR 0.3582 0.2697 
PROPF 0.3813 -0.1659 SECU 0.2574 0.4895 
CORF 0.3044 -0.0388    
 
Using these principal components for regression we obtain the results as 
presented in the Table 7. As we can see the first components of both IEF and EBRD 
data are positive and significant while both of the second components are not. The 
 22
results for economic freedom is reassuring when the simple average index is significant 
but just some of individual variables are (Table 3 and 4). The result for the EBRD 
component confirms the importance of liberalisation, including price liberalisation. An 
increase in any liberalisation measures will lead to considerably higher score for the 
first principal component and this is associated with higher investment rate. With regard 
to control variables we have similar results as compared to previous specifications.  
 
Table 7 
Estimation results with first two components (PC1 and PC2) of IEF and EBRD  
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP 
Variable IEF EBRD 
PC1 0.037** 1.366*** 
PC2 0.014 0.34 
Lagged growth 0.003 0.085* 
Lagged saving 0.131** 0.102** 
OPEN 0.012 -0.008 
M3/GDP 0.106*** 0.077*** 
Inflation -0.002 0.002** 
Govcon 0.14 -0.036 
constant 9.394*** 8.218* 
Est. method FE FE 
No. of obs. 325 361 
R2 0.29 0.3 
Note: PC1 and PC2 are first two components retained from the principal component analysis of 
the underlying IEF and EBRD variables. *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively (based on robust standard errors)  
VI. Conclusion 
Investment is the vehicle of growth and efficiency. Without investment growth 
can not be sustained. More importantly, investment is the channel of “creative 
destruction” that both raises production capacity and improves efficiency. For transition 
countries investment plays a very important role because they need to restructure their 
economies to shift production from central planning to market economy. Therefore, it is 
important to understand what drives investment in transition economies.  
This paper shows that institutional factors play a significant role in explaining 
investment differences. In general, higher degree of both economic and political 
freedoms is associated with higher rate of investment to GDP ratio. However, it should 
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be stressed that one individual economic institution alone would not make much 
difference. It is the overall bettering of the economic institutions that matter in inducing 
investment. As far as political freedom is concerned both political rights and civil 
liberties are important in promoting investment through the effect of political rights is 
stronger than that of civil liberties. Since many studies have confirmed that institutions 
have significant effect on growth, even after controlling for investment, and given the 
fact that investment has been found to have significant effect on growth, our results 
further strengthen the argument for institutions as significant factors in explaining 
growth. This is in line with Dawson’s (1998) claim that institutions affect growth 
directly through total factor productivity and indirectly through investment.  
In addition, this paper shows that those who are ahead in the transition process 
have higher investment rate, especially with regard to large scale privatization. Almost 
all indicators of transition reform have significant effect on investment rate. This should 
be an encouragement for transition countries that are still lagging behind in the race to 
building a mature market economy. Last but not least, domestic saving and financial 
development is crucial if transition countries are to boost investment and achieve 
healthy growth. In general, the findings in this paper are in line with previous findings 
in the literature on determinants of investment. 
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Appendix 
Transition economies and averages of variables used in the regressions (1990-2007) 
Country Investment1 IEF2 FHI EBRD Growth Saving1 Openness M31 Inflation
Government 
consumption1
Albania 20.34 56.20 3.72 3.64 2.813 -5.979 59.70 61.64 29.58 12.07 
Armenia 22.43 61.70 4.15 3.39 3.757 0.703 80.13 21.10 375.50 12.50 
Azerbaijan 29.46 48.21 5.44 2.91 3.778 23.109 92.35 21.01 232.01 15.12 
Belarus 25.51 41.00 5.59 2.06 2.776 23.464 122.54 19.83 338.90 20.27 
Bulgaria 17.99 53.66 2.11 3.55 0.775 13.786 108.89 57.32 91.14 16.86 
Cambodia 14.48 59.10 5.72 N/A 8.571 5.1236 86.63 14.54 3.64 5.63 
China 35.18 52.95 6.72 N/A 9.983 42.542 47.42 126.74 5.76 14.97 
Croatia 21.50 51.81 3.06 3.96 1.373 14.233 103.15 50.14 137.14 24.22 
Czech 
Republic 27.57 67.86 1.47 4.01 2.021 27.475 117.03 68.64 8.76 21.64 
Estonia 26.84 73.28 1.68 3.84 2.702 24.419 151.71 41.16 71.65 19.90 
Georgia 20.60 55.60 4.06 3.38 -1.652 2.5051 79.67 12.24 1286.97 11.20 
Hungary 21.62 61.26 1.47 4.06 1.793 23.065 110.38 48.73 14.54 10.64 
Kazakhstan 23.26 51.78 5.38 3.22 2.211 25.443 90.47 19.65 277.01 12.29 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 16.39 56.09 4.65 3.62 0.027 4.902 85.55 17.74 117.84 19.25 
Lao PDR 28.50 39.41 6.50 N/A 6.42 17.881 60.53 15.99 23.74 7.77 
Latvia 20.87 64.58 1.88 3.78 1.974 21.072 100.75 32.67 73.39 19.07 
Lithuania 22.60 63.98 1.68 3.74 1.595 16.294 107.27 28.02 96.96 18.85 
Macedonia 17.35 58.63 3.25 3.88 0.482 7.0175 93.49 29.18 118.61 19.95 
Moldova 19.14 54.47 3.68 3.24 -2.734 8.357 113.83 31.14 137.48 17.74 
Mongolia 28.57 56.15 2.42 3.44 2.719 19.684 120.67 30.91 49.19 17.85 
Poland 19.90 58.94 1.53 4.10 3.942 19.315 58.36 39.23 16.18 19.45 
Romania 20.32 51.32 2.83 3.51 1.205 16.267 64.11 33.97 71.32 11.00 
Russia 19.76 51.61 4.38 3.26 0.398 32.5 57.57 26.32 182.12 17.64 
Slovak 
Republic 28.57 60.27 1.89 3.97 2.564 23.892 133.02 61.10 9.10 21.70 
Slovenia 23.37 58.79 1.41 3.97 2.88 24.924 120.47 40.35 27.15 19.15 
Tajikistan 14.94 47.35 5.88 2.78 -1.272 9.058 111.10 7.83 180.02 12.47 
Turkmenistan 33.21 43.02 6.89 1.66 -1.787 32.885 135.71 16.08 647.15 13.39 
Ukraine 21.68 47.67 3.47 2.91 -1.655 25.128 88.20 29.15 379.08 19.41 
Uzbekistan 26.48 40.51 6.56 2.30 2.483 21.93 59.28  220.74 19.77 
Vietnam 29.14 44.35 6.72 N/A 7.509 21.745 104.74 48.05 15.36 7.23 
Note: 1 as % of GDP; 2 only available from 1995. Source: WBDI (2008), Heritage Foundation (2008), 
Freedom House (2008) and EBRD Transition Index (2008) 
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